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Re´sume´
Dans ce papier nous traitons le proble`me de base de consommation
a` deux pe´riodes ou` l’utilite´ de la consommation en premie`re et deuxie`me
pe´riode, respectivement: v et u, est suppose´e concave. Conside´rant l’hypo-
the`se usuelle de l’identite´ de u et v, nous montrons que la prudence est
entie`rement caracte´rise´e par la convexite´ de u
′
dans le mode`le EU. Plus
inte´ressant, nous montrons que pour le mode`le RDEU, la prudence est
entie`rement caracte´rise´e par la convexite´ de u
′
et le pessimisme fort. Le
papier finit en montrant que pour un de´cideur RDEU adversaire fort du
risque, le pessimisme strict implique la prudence faible locale, quel que
soit le signe de u
′′′
.
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Abstract
In this paper we deal with the basic two-period consumption saving
problem where the first and second period consumption utility, respec-
tively v and u is assumed to be concave as usually. Considering the usual
assumption of identity of u and v, we show that prudence is fully char-
acterized by the convexity of u′ in the EU model. More interesting we
prove that for the RDEU model, prudence is fully characterized by the
convexity of u′ and strong pessimism. The paper ends by showing that for
a strong risk averse RDEU decision maker, strict pessimism allows local
weak prudence, whatever the sign of u′′′.
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1 Introduction
The most popular model which has been used to analyze consumption decisions
under risk is the basic two-period ”Consumption-Saving” model where the de-
cision maker (DM) is supposed to be a risk averse expected utility maximizer
(see, Leland [12] and Sandmo [17]). An important question to ask is: how an
agent’s saving is affected by an increase in risk. If the individual may want to
increase his saving in the face of risk, his reaction indeed is associated with the
notion of ”Precautionary saving”.
Kimball [11] has proposed to define as a prudent DM any individual who dis-
plays a positive motive for precautionary saving - that is: a prudent DM in-
creases his saving when the risk on his future income increases. Since Leland
[12], Dre`ze and Modigliani [9], Sandmo [17], it is well known that in the basic
two-period model, the convexity of the marginal utility of second period is a
sufficient condition for a risk averse DM to be prudent. Nevertheless, the ne-
cessity of the convexity of the marginal utility has not yet been proved. This
remark also applies to the analysis of consumption decisions in the context of
non expected utility decision models (Demers and Demers [7], Etner [10]).
In this paper, we revisit the basic two-period consumption/saving decisions
model, where in the first period, the consumer is endowed with an initial (non
risky) wealth w, while in the second period, his income is supposed to be risky,
represented by a random variable Y, with a known probability distribution. We
consider necessary and sufficient conditions for prudence, first in the Expected
utility case and then in the Rank Dependant one. For its main part, the pa-
per also focuses on the case where the DM is facing a large increase in risk,
according to the popular criterion used by economists of the second stochastic
dominance (SSD) order. But it is well known that Arrow [3] has shown that in
fact, a risk averse EU DM facing risky prospects with small variance behaves
locally as a risk neutral DM. Segal and Spivak [18] define this attitude as second
order risk aversion, and show that in contrast, any RDEU DM risk averse in the
strong sense, displays first order risk aversion (i.e. risk aversion for small risks).
Hence, in the last part of the paper, we focus on the precautionary motive for
saving when the future income is seen as such a small risk.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the concepts used
for our theoretical model. In section 4 we study the consumption/saving prob-
lem in the Expected Utility model and we show that, if the agent keeps the same
function of utility in both periods, convexity of the (second period) marginal
utility (i.e. u′′′ ≥ 0) is necessary and sufficient for prudence. Then relaxing the
assumption of an identical utility index in both period, we consider two partic-
ular cases for which the DM will be prudent whatever the sign of u′′′. Section 5
deals with the Rank Dependent Expected Utility model. We prove that if the
agent considers the same concave utility function in both periods then under
Inada conditions, the DM is prudent if and only if he is strictly risk averse in
the strong sense and u′′′ ≥ 0.
Section 6 introduces the case of a small (second period) income risk. The DM
will be in some sense ”prudent”, if when facing a small actuarially neutral risk,
then he increases his saving. We will term his attitude as a locally weakly pru-
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dent behavior. We will prove that for the RDEU model, if a DM is strictly risk
averse and strictly pessimistic, he will be locally weakly prudent whatever the
sign of u′′′ is, a behavior not necessarily verified by a strictly risk averse EU
DM. Section 7 concludes.
2 Risk and increase in risk: the framework
Let us begin with some basic notations and definitions. Since the topics of the
paper is the analysis of savings decision under risk, when we will speak in the
sequel of a situation as a risky one, we mean the following.
We consider a decision maker (DM) faced with choices among risky assets X,
the set V of such assets consisting of all bounded real random variables defined
on a probability space (S,A, P ) assumed to be sufficiently rich to generate any
bounded real-valued random variables. S is the set of states of nature, A is a
σ-algebra of events, and P is a σ-additive non atomic probability measure on
(S,A).
For X ∈ V, FX will denote the cumulative distribution function of X : FX(t) =
P (X ≤ t), and E(X) the mathematical expectation of X : E(X) = ∫ xdFX(x).
A finite discrete random variable X, will be also denoted as:
L(X) = (x1 , p1;x2, p2; ...;xn, pn), with pi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1, and assuming that
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn without loss of generality.
Now, let  be the preference relation over V of a decision maker (DM there-
after). Thus for any pair of real random variables X,Y ∈ V : X  Y means
that for the DM, X is at least as good as Y .
The relation  is assumed to be a weak order (i.e.: transitive and complete pref-
erence ordering)1 and also monotone (i.e.: X  Y + .S∗,  > 0⇒ X  Y )2.
One of the most popular criterion used by economists to represent the idea of
an increase in risk, is the second stochastic dominance order (SSD).
By definition, for any X,Y ∈ V, we say that Y is dominated by X with respect
to the SSD order (that is Y is riskier than X) if:∫ t
−∞
FY (x)dx ≥
∫ t
−∞
FX(x)dx, ∀t ∈ R
When we constrain X and Y to have the same mean (i.e.: E(X) = E(Y )), then
Y is said to be a Mean Preserving Increase in Risk (MPIR thereafter) of X,
denoted Y MPIR X.
As shown earlier by Rothschild and Stiglitz [14], this notion of MPIR leads to
a very natural definition for the behavioral concept of aversion to risk.
1A non trivial weak order is a relation between the elements of V which is:
• Transitive: ∀X, Y, Z ∈ V, X  Y, Y  Z implies X  Y.
• Complete: ∀X, Y ∈ V, X  Y or Y  X.
2For A ∈ A,De Finetti ’s use of A∗ to denote the characteristic function of A : [A∗(s) =
1 if s ∈ A, A∗(s) = 0 if s /∈ A] will be adopted.
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Definition 2.1 (Rothschild and Stiglitz [16])
The DM is strongly risk averse if: ∀X,Y ∈ V, such that Y MPIR X, then
X  Y.
Note that economists are usually more familiar with the definition of risk aver-
sion initially proposed by Pratt and Arrow:
Definition 2.2 (Arrow [2], Pratt [13])
The DM is weakly risk averse if ∀X ∈ V, E(X).S∗  X.
Trivially, given that X MPIR E(X) for any X, risk aversion in the strong
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz implies risk aversion in the weaker sense of
Arrow-Pratt.
3 The representation of the decision maker’s prefer-
ences: Assumptions
Following the descriptive solution of Allais [1], Quiggin [14] and Yaari [20] have
proposed a generalization of the Expected Utility approach rationalizing the
basic idea that facing with a risk associated to a known probability distribu-
tion, a DM distorts the probabilities in a subjective manner that depends on
the relative ranking of the payments to which they are associated. Several au-
thors as for instance Chateauneuf [4] and Wakker [19] have proposed alternative
axiomatics that lead to a Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU thereafter)
representation of the preferences of such a DM.
The fundamental aspect of the RDEU model is the weakening of the indepen-
dence axiom which is central to the Expected Utility model (EU thereafter). It
is replaced by the comonotonic sure thing principle. Let us recall the definition
of comonotonicity:
Definition 3.3 Two random variables X and Y are comonotonic if ∀s, s′ ∈ S,
then
(X(s)−X(s′))(Y (s)− Y (s′)) ≥ 0.
The RDEU model can be defined as follows: If the preferences of the DM re-
spect the axioms of the RDEU model (  on V is transitive, complete and
monotone, satisfies comonotonic sure thing principle and some additional tech-
nical properties), then there exists two functions:
i) u : V → R which is a continuous and increasing utility function, which is
unique up to a positive affine transformation.
ii) f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] which is a continuous and increasing probability transfor-
mation function, satisfying: f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1,
such that ∀X,Y ∈ V, X % Y ⇔ EfoP (u(X)) ≥ EfoP (u(Y )) where ∀Z ∈ V:
EfoP (u(Z)) =
∫ 0
−∞
[f(P (u(Z) > t)− 1] dt+
∫ +∞
0
f(P (u(Z) > t)dt
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In the case where we focuse the attention on discrete random variables, the
value function Ef (u(Z)) may be written as:
EfoP (u(Z)) = u(z1) +
n∑
i=2
[u(zi)− u(zi−1)] f
 n∑
j=2
pj

Then, it is easy to see that the RDEU representation of the preferences is based
on an intuitive behavioral principle: the DM takes for sure the utility of the
worst outcome u(z1) and weights the successive additional increases of the util-
ity u(zi) − u(zi−1) by f(
∑n
j=i pj), which may be understood as a subjective
transformation of the probability to obtain at least the outcome zi.
While the RDEU model is a generalization of the EU model, it may also en-
compass the Dual Theory of Yaari. On one hand, if the perception function f
is the identity function, then EfoP (u(Z)) = E(u(Z)). On the other hand, if the
utility function u is the identity function, then EfoP (u(Z)) = EfoP (Z) which
is the Yaari functional. Finally, if both the risk perception function and the
utility function are the identity, then EfoP (u(Z)) is simply the expected value
E(Z) of the random variable.
It is worth noting that for a RDEU DM, risk aversion in the strong sense
is characterized by the concavity of u and the convexity of f (Chew, Karni and
Safra [6]).
Note also that when the transformation function f is convex, it turns out that
the set-function ν = foP is a convex capacity on (S,A): ν(∅) = 0, ν(S) = 1,
A, B ∈ A, A ⊂ B ⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B) and (convexity) ∀A, B ∈ A, ν(A)+ ν(B) ≤
ν(A ∪B) + ν(A ∩B).
Accordingly we will make an extensive use of the following lemma (see Propo-
sition 10.1 in Denneberg [8]):
Lemma 3.1 Let f be a convex probability transformation function. Then for
any class C of (pairwise) comonotonic random variables in V, there exists a
probability measure Q on (S,A), Q ≥ foP such that ∀X ∈ C : EfoP (X) =
EQ(X).
4 The basic EU-based Consumption/Saving prob-
lem
Let us consider the basic two-period model which has been extensively used
since Leland [12] and Sandmo [17], to analyze consumption decisions under
risk.
In the first period, the consumer is endowed with a deterministic initial wealth
w, while his second-period income is risky, represented as a random variable Y
with a perfectly known probability distribution. There exists in the economy
a technology of storage, which has the main characteristic that one unit of
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consumption today may be transformed in one unit of consumption tomorrow.
In words, the access to this technology implies no transaction costs, no loss of
initial value but also proceeds no additional value.
Hence, when the agent uses this storage technology, everything goes as if he
may save part of his current income and is rewarded with a risk-free interest
rate equal to zero. Assume that the preferences of the agent respect the axioms
of the EU model, with a time-additively separable representation.
Denoting c1 and C2 respectively the first-period and second-period consumption
levels, the intertemporal utility of the consumer is denoted: U(c1, C2) = v(c1)+
Eu(C2).
The consumption/saving problem of the agent corresponds to the choice of
x ∈ [0, w] so as to maximize v(w − x) + Eu(Y + x).
We assume that u and v the two consumption utility functions are real-valued,
defined on R+ and satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 4.1 :
i) v is two times continuously differentiable, with v′ > 0 and v′′ ≤ 0;
ii) u is three times continuously differentiable, with u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0;
iii) u or v is strictly concave.
These assumptions are quite natural in the present context:
4.1i) implies that more consumption today is always desirable and that the
marginal utility of money today is decreasing, which appears as a usual as-
sumption under certainty.
4.1ii) means that more consumption tomorrow is also always desirable, but that
more risk is never desirable: since Dre`ze and Modigliani [9], it is well known
that when he is facing a set of such temporal lotteries (c1, C2), the DM’s at-
titude towards risk is embedded only through the assumption made on the
curvature of the second period utility function (assuming a time-additively sep-
arable representation of the preferences). Hence, the DM is risk averse if and
only if u is concave. Apart a long stream of controversies on this point, it is
worth noting that the concavity of both utility functions may also be usefully
justified, at least from an economically meaningful point of view, on the ground
that it guarantees the positivity of the income effects. In other words, v′′ ≤ 0
is required soon as we assume that the second period consumption is a normal
good, while u′′ ≤ 0 insures that the first period consumption is also a normal
good.
Finally, 4.1iii) appears as technically useful and tractable. To see this point,
denote:
g(x) = v(w − x) + Eu(Y + x).
On the one hand, from the continuity of u and v in R+, we conclude that g
is also continuous in [0, w] . On the second hand, from 4.1iii) we conclude that
g is strictly concave in [0, w] . As a result, g has a unique maximum on [0, w].
Hence under 4.1, the basic consumption/saving problem is well behaved and
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has a unique solution.
In this problem, the DM obtains through his savings decision a perfect control
as far as his first period consumption level is concerned: c1 is a deterministic
variable. But in contrast, the decision to save, even when saving the full amount
of the current income, gives him only a partial control of the second period con-
sumption level: C2 is a random variable, contingent on the realization of the
risky income. Hence, the desire to smooth the intertemporal consumption may
not be the unique motive of savings here. In order to hedge against the second
period income risk (and possibly the most defavorable realizations of the future
income), the DM may also display a precautionary saving motive.
Kimball [11] proposes to define as a prudent DM any individual who displays
a positive motive for precautionary savings - that is: a prudent DM increases
his savings when the risk on his future income increases.
Formally, denote x∗(Y,w) (respectively x∗(Y˜ , w)) the DM’s amount of optimal
savings when his future income is Y (respectively Y˜ ) and his initial wealth is
w. Then:
Definition 4.4 The individual is prudent if ∀Y, Y˜ ∈ V, such that Y˜ MPIRY
and ∀w ≥ 0 then x∗(Y˜ , w) ≥ x∗(Y,w).
Since Leland [12], Dre`ze and Modigliani [9] and Sandmo [17], it is well known
that the convexity of the (second period) marginal utility (i.e. u′′′ > 0) is a
sufficient condition to obtain that a risk averse DM has a positive precautionary
saving motive. For his own, Kimball [11] argues in a stimulating paper that
there is an isomorphism between the concept of risk aversion and the concept
of prudence that may be fruitfully exploited. Then, he suggests that in order to
evaluate the intensity of the precautionary saving motive, it may be possible (for
a small zero-mean income risk) to define a precautionary premium Ψ(ε, x) =
(−u′′′(x)u′′(x) )σ
2
ε
2 where (−u
′′′(x)
u′′(x) ) is an index of prudence.
Nevertheless, the necessity of the convexity of u′ has not yet been proved.
In the following propositions, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that
in the case where v = u, the condition u′′′ ≥ 0 is necessary and sufficient for
prudence. Then, in the general case where v 6= u, we consider two cases for
which the DM will be prudent whatever the sign of u′′′ is.
Assumption 4.2 v = u.
Proposition 4.1 Under assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, the DM is prudent if and
only if u′′′ ≥ 0.
Before proceeding with the proof, let us denote, for all Y and Y˜ in V:
g(x) = v(w−x)+Eu(Y +x) and h(x) = v(w−x)+Eu(Y˜ +x), for all x ∈ [0, w].
Proof
(⇒)
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Let us consider the following alternative distribution functions for the second
period income: L(Y˜ ) = (a, 12 ; b, 12) and L(Y ) = (12a+ 12b, 1). Trivially, Y˜ MPIR
Y.
Since u
′
is continuous, to prove that u′′′ ≥ 0, it is enough to prove that:
∀a, b ∈ R, u′(1
2
a+
1
2
b) ≤ 1
2
u′(a) +
1
2
u′(b).
Define respectively g and h on [0, w] , by :
g(x) = u(w−x)+u(12a+ 12b+x) and h(x) = u(w−x)+ 12u(a+x)+ 12u(b+x).
Hence, g′(0) = −u′(w) + u′(12a+ 12b) and h′(0) = −u′(w) + 12u′(a) + 12u′(b).
Let  > 0 and take w = 12a+
1
2b+ . Since u is strictly concave, g
′(0) > 0, and
therefore x∗(Y,w) > 0.
If h′(0) < 0, since h is strictly concave, x∗(Y˜ , w) = 0. Therefore h′(0) ≥ 0, that
is u′(12a+
1
2b+ ) ≤ 12u′(a)+ 12u′(b), for all  > 0. Now by continuity of u′, when
 tends to 0 we have: u′(12a+
1
2b) ≤ 12u′(a) + 12u′(b), ∀a, b ∈ R. Therefore u′ is
convex.
(⇐)
Assume u′′′ ≥ 0. If x∗(Y,w) = 0, the result is trivial.
Assume that x∗(Y,w) ∈ (0, w]. Given that g is strictly concave, then g′(x) > 0,
∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y,w)). To show that x∗(Y,w) ≤ x∗(Y˜ , w), it remains to prove that
h′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y,w)). Since Y˜ MPIRY , then Y˜ + xMPIRY + x,
∀x ∈ [0, w]. By hypotheses (i.e.: u concave and u′′′ ≥ 0), we obtain that −u′ is
increasing and concave.
Hence, ∀x ∈ [0, w], E(−u′(Y + x)) ≥ E(−u′(Y˜ + x)). Therefore, Eu′(Y + x) ≤
Eu′(Y˜ +x). Adding both sides with −u′(w−x), we obtain: g′(x) ≤ h′(x),∀x ∈
[0, w], hence: h′(x) > 0,∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y )). As a result, x∗(Y˜ , w) ≥ x∗(Y,w).
Now, we consider two alternative cases where the DM is prudent whatever
the sign of u′′′ is.
Proposition 4.2 Under assumption 4.1, if sup v′ < inf u′, then the DM is
prudent.
Proof
Take X in V, w > 0 and x ∈ R, hence Eu′(X + x) ≥ inf u′, and since inf u′ >
sup v′, Eu′(X + x) > v′(w − x). That is g′(x) = −v′(w − x) + Eu′(X + x) > 0
for all x ∈ [0, w] , therefore x∗(X,w) = w. As a result, the individual is always
prudent.
Example 1:
Take u : R+ → R defined by u(x) = x − (x + 2) exp(−x) and let v : R+ → R
defined by v(x) = −12 exp(−x); u and v satisfy assumption 4.1. One obtains
1 = inf u′ > sup v′ = 12 , but u
′′′ ≥ 0 if x ≥ 1, and u′′′ ≤ 0 if x ∈ [0, 1).
Proposition 4.3 Under assumption 4.1, if supu′ < inf v′, then the DM is
prudent.
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Proof
Take X in V, w > 0 and x ∈ R, hence Eu′(X + x) ≤ supu′, and since supu′ <
inf v′, Eu′(X + x) < v′(w − x). That is g′(x) = −v′(w − x) + Eu′(X + x) < 0,
for all x ∈ [0, w] , therefore x∗(X,w) = 0. As a result, the individual is always
prudent.
Example 2:
Take u : R+ → R defined by u(x) = −12(x + 2) exp(−x) and v : R+ → R,
defined by v(x) = x − exp(−x); u and v satisfy assumption 4.1. One obtains
1 = inf v′ > supu′ = 12 , but u
′′′ ≥ 0 if x ≥ 1, and u′′′ < 0 if x ∈ [0, 1).
Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 exhibit two alternative sets of assumptions for which
the savings decision of a risk averse DM is defined as a corner solution for the
problem of maximizing his intertemporal utility function. Truly speaking, in
both instances, the DM’s optimal saving level is independent of the future in-
come riskiness. Nevertheless, the DM is said to be prudent in the common sense
of the literature, since he does not reduce his savings when the risk associated
to his second period income increases, the amount of saving is constant (either
w or 0).
5 The RDEU-based consumption/saving problem
Assume now that the DM’s preferences over temporal lotteries (c1, C2) satisfy
the RDEU axioms, and admit a time-additively separable representation given
by:
V (c1, C2) = v(c1) + EfoPu(C2).
We firstly establish that u′′′ ≥ 0 is sufficient for prudence, although the convex-
ity of f is at the same time required. In other words, if the DM is risk averse
in the strong sense and if his (second period) marginal utility is convex, then
he is prudent.
Proposition 5.4 Under assumption 4.1, assume that f and u′ are convex, then
the DM is prudent.
Before proceeding with the proof, let us denote for all Y, Y˜ ∈ V and x ∈ [0, w]:
g(x) = v(w − x) + EfoPu(Y + x) and h(x) = v(w − x) + EfoPu(Y˜ + x).
Since u and −u′ are both non-decreasing, it turns out that ∀Z ∈ V, ∀x ∈ R
u(x+ Z) and −u′(x+ Z) are comonotone, hence from lemma 3.1 (EfoPu(Z +
x))
′
= −EfoP (−u′(Z+x)), and therefore g′(x) = −v′(w−x)−EfoP (−u′(Y +x))
and h
′
(x) = −v′(w − x)− EfoP (−u′(Y˜ + x)).
Proof
Let Y, Y˜ ∈ V, such that Y˜ MPIR Y . If x∗(Y,w) = 0, the result is triv-
ial.
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Assume that x∗(Y,w) ∈ (0, w], since g is strictly concave we have: g′(x) >
0, ∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y,w)). Hence to show that x∗(Y˜ , w) ≥ x∗(Y,w), it is enough to
show that ∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y,w)) , h′(x) > 0.
By assumption, −u′ is concave and non-decreasing, and f is convex.
From Chew, Karni and Safra ([6], theorem 2), since for any x, Y˜ + x MPIR
Y + x we directly obtain that: EfoP (−u′(Y + x)) ≥ EfoP (−u′(Y˜ + x)). Then
−EfoP (−u′(Y +x)) ≤ −EfoP (−u′(Y˜ +x)). Therefore h′(x) ≥ g′(x), ∀x ∈ [0, w] .
As a result, we have: h′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [0, x∗(Y,w)) , which completes the proof.
Assumption 5.3 f is continuously differentiable on [0, 1].
Proposition 5.5 Under assumptions 4.1, 4.2 and 5.3 the DM is prudent if
and only if f and u′ are both convex.
Before proceeding with the proof of proposition 5.5, it is worth noting that it
may be formulated as follows: under assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, the DM is pru-
dent if and only if he is strictly risk averse in the strong sense and u′ is convex.
Proof
(⇒)
Let Y, Y˜ ∈ V be such that: L(Y ) = (y1, p1; y2, p2; y3, p3), with 0 ≤ y1 < y2 < y3
and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 taking p1 < 1, p2 > 0, p3 < 1; and
L(Y˜ ) = (y1, p1 + 1; y2, p2 + 2; y3, p3 + 3), where 1, 2, 3 ∈ R satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions: 1 + 2 + 3 = 0, and 1y1 + 2y2 + 3y3 = 0. This implies
that: 
1 = 
2 = −y3−y1y3−y2 
3 = y2−y1y3−y2 
Take now  > 0; as a result, Y˜ MPIR Y .
∀x ∈ [0, w] :
g(x) = u(w−x)+u(y1+x)+[u(y2+x)−u(y1+x)]f(p2+p3)+[u(y3+x)−u(y2+x)]f(p3)
h(x) = u(w−x)+u(y1+x)+[u(y2+x)−u(y1+x)]f(p2+p3−)+[u(y3+x)−u(y2+x)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
Then:
g′(x) = −u′(w−x)+u′(y1+x)+[u′(y2+x)−u′(y1+x)]f(p2+p3)+[u′(y3+x)−u′(y2+x)]f(p3)
h′(x) = −u′(w−x)+u′(y1+x)+[u′(y2+x)−u′(y1+x)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3+x)−u′(y2+x)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
For x = 0, we obtain:
g′(0) = −u′(w) + u′(y1) + [u′(y2)− u′(y1)]f(p2 + p3) + [u′(y3)− u′(y2)]f(p3)
h′(0) = −u′(w)+u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
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−EfoP (−u′(Y )) = u′(y1) + [u′(y2)− u′(y1)]f(p2 + p3) + [u′(y3)− u′(y2)]f(p3)
= u′(y1)(1− f(p2 + p3)) + u′(y2)(f(p2 + p3)− f(p2)) + u′(y3)f(p3)
−EfoP (−u′(Y )) ∈ [u′(y3), u′(y1)]. Since u′ is continuous, ∃w ∈ [y1, y3] such
that
u′(w) = −EfoP (−u′(Y ))
Let wn = w + 1n > w, ∀n ∈ N∗, wn → w
For n ∈ N∗, we have g′(0) = −u′(wn)+u′(w) > 0, since u′ is strictly decreasing.
By assumption of prudence (x∗(Y˜ , w) ≥ x∗(Y,w)), we obtain h′(0) > 0, hence:
u′(wn) < u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+ y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
When n→∞, we have:
−EfoP (−u′(Y )) ≤ u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 ).
Given the differentiability of f , the first order Taylor formula gives:
f(p2 + p3 − ) = f(p2 + p3)− f ′(p2 + p3) + o1().
f(p3 + y2−y1y3−y2 ) = f(p3) +
y2−y1
y3−y2 f
′(p3) + o2().
Then we obtain:
−f ′(p2 + p3)[u′(y2)− u′(y1)] + y2−y1y3−y2 f ′(p3)[u′(y3)− u′(y2)] + α() ≥ 0, where
lim→0 α() = 0.
Dividing by  > 0 and letting  tend to zero, we obtain:
y2 − y1
y3 − y2 f
′(p3)[u′(y3)− u′(y2)] ≥ f ′(p2 + p3)[u′(y2)− u′(y1)] (I).
By continuity of f ′, when p2 → 0 and p3 is chosen such that f ′(p3) > 0 we have:
u′(y2)− u′(y1)
y2 − y1 ≤
u′(y3)− u′(y2)
y3 − y2 .
therefore, u′ is convex.
Now, let us consider the inequality (I), and let us take simultaneously y3 → y2
and y1 → y2. Since u is twice differentiable, we obtain:
f ′(p2 + p3)u′′(y2) ≤ f ′(p3)u′′(y2)
By strict concavity of u, we may assume y2 chosen such that u
′′
(y2) < 0, there-
fore f ′(p3 + p2) ≥ f ′(p3) which means that:
f ′(q) ≥ f ′(p), ∀0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1, hence f is convex.
(⇐) The proof for sufficiency is the same as in proposition 5.4.
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Assumption 5.4 (Inada Conditions for v) v′(0) =∞ and v′(∞) = 0.
Proposition 5.6 Under assumptions 4.1, 5.3 and 5.4, the DM is prudent if
and only if f and u′ are both convex.
Once more, before proceeding with the proof of proposition 5.6, it is worth
noting that it may be formulated as follows: under assumptions 4.1, 5.3 and
5.4, the DM is prudent if and only if he is risk averse in the strong sense and
u′ (second period marginal utility) is convex.
Proof
(⇒)
Consider Y, Y˜ ∈ V as in the proof of proposition 5.5, we choose y2 such that
u′′(y2) < 0, Y˜ MPIR Y .
Define ∀x ∈ [0, w] :
g(x) = v(w−x)+u(y1+x)+[u(y2+x)−u(y1+x)]f(p2+p3)+[u(y3+x)−u(y2+x)]f(p3)
h(x) = v(w−x)+u(y1+x)+[u(y2+x)−u(y1+x)]f(p2+p3−)+[u(y3+x)−u(y2+x)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
So:
g′(x) = −v′(w−x)+u′(y1+x)+[u′(y2+x)−u′(y1+x)]f(p2+p3)+[u′(y3+x)−u′(y2+x)]f(p3)
h′(x) = −v′(w−x)+u′(y1+x)+[u′(y2+x)−u′(y1+x)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3+x)−u′(y2+x)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
For x = 0, we obtain:
g′(0) = −v′(w)− EfoP (−u′(Y ))
= −v′(w) + u′(y1) + [u′(y2)− u′(y1)]f(p2 + p3) + [u′(y3)− u′(y2)]f(p3)
h′(0) = −v′(w)+u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
Since, u and f are increasing, then −EfoP (−u′(Y )) > 0.
By assumption 5.4 and continuity of v′, there exists a sequence wn > 0 such
that: cn = v′(wn) < −EfoP (−u′(Y )) and cn ↑ −EfoP (−u′(Y )).
As a result, ∀wn we have: g′(0) > 0. On the other hand, by assumption of
prudence (x∗(Y˜ , w) ≥ x∗(Y,w)), we obtain h′(0) > 0; hence:
v′(wn) < u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+ y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
When n→∞, we have:
−EfoP (−u′(Y )) ≤ u′(y1)+[u′(y2)−u′(y1)]f(p2+p3−)+[u′(y3)−u′(y2)]f(p3+y2 − y1
y3 − y2 )
The remainder of the proof is the same one as in proposition 5.5.
(⇐)
The proof for sufficiency is the same as in proposition 5.4.
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6 The Local Weak Prudence
The results of the previous sections are based on the notion of mean preserving
increase in risk (MPIR), which is usually more relevant when we consider a
class of large risks. But some of the well known paradoxes in decision theory
appear in the range of small risks. For instance, Arrow [3] has shown that in
fact a risk averse EU DM behaves locally in a risk neutral manner, where by
locally we mean: facing risky prospects with small variance.
Segal and Spivak [18] define this attitude as second order risk aversion, and
they show that in contrast, any RDEU DM, risk averse in the strong sense,
displays first order risk aversion (that is, he is also risk averse for small risks).
In this part of the paper, we focus on the precautionary motive for saving
when the future income is seen as a small risk, defined as follows.
Let (a,w) ∈ R+2∗ be given, with a a deterministic second period income level.
Let Z be a random variable with zero-mean, and consider a+ tZ with t small
enough such that a + tZ ≥ 0. Hence, tZ may be seen as a small noise which
adds to the determinist future income.
Intuitively speaking, the DM will be in some sense ”prudent”, if facing with a
small actuarially neutral risk, then he increases his savings. We will term this
attitude as a locally weakly prudent behavior. Formally:
Definition 6.5 The DM is locally weakly prudent if ∀(a,w) ∈ R+2∗ , ∀X ∈ V
with E(Z) = 0, there exists t0 > 0 such that 0 < |t| ≤ t0 implies x∗(a+tZ,w) ≥
x∗(a,w).
It is now shown that in the EU model, the individual may not be locally weakly
prudent. This is done by constructing a counter-example.
A Counter-example:
Let u : R+ → R and v : R+ → R defined by:
u(x) = −1.2(x + 2) exp(−x) strictly increasing, strictly concave and v(x) = x
strictly increasing, concave and u′′′ ≥ 0 if x ≥ 1, u′′′ ≤ 0 if x ≤ 1.
Let a = 0.5 and w = 2 fixed and L(Z) = (−0.1, 12 ; 0.1, 12), E(Z) = 0. It re-
mains to show that for all 0 < t0 ≤ 5, there exists 0 < |t| ≤ t0 such that
x∗(0.5 + tZ, 2) < x∗(0.5, 2). For simplicity of notation, denote x∗(0.5, 2) = x∗
g(x) = 2− x+ u(0.5 + x), so
g′(x) = −1 + u′(0.5 + x) = −1 + 1.2(x+ 1.5) exp−(x+ 0.5) and
g′′(x) = −1.2(x+ 0.5) exp−(x+ 0.5)
It is very easy to verify that the optimal solution x∗ of the maximization of g
under x ∈ [0, 2] exists, unique and satisfy g′(x∗) = 0, since g′(0) > 0 and g′ < 2.
Also we can easly check that 0, 2 < x∗ < 0, 3.
Let us show that ∀ 0 < |t| ≤ 1, h′(x∗) < 0, which will complete the proof.
h(x) = 2−x+Eu(a+x+ tZ), then h′(x) = −1+ 12u
′
(0.5+x−0.1t)+ 12u
′
(0.5+
x+ 0.1t).
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Since 0.5+x∗−0.1t and 0.5+x∗+0.1t belong in (0, 1) and u′ is strictly concave
in (0, 1), h′(x∗) < −1+u′(0.5+x∗−0.1t+0.5+x∗+0.1t2 ) = −1+u
′
(0.5+x∗) = 0. That
is x∗(0.5 + tZ, 2) < x∗(0.5, 2),∀ 0 < |t| ≤ 1.
Assume that the preference of the DM respects the RDEU axioms. Consider
the additional following assumption:
Assumption 6.5 :
i) f ′′ ≥ 0 and f(p) < p ∀p ∈ (0, 1).
ii) u ∈ C2(R+,R) and u′′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ R+.
6.5i) says that the DM is strictly pessimistic: this hypothesis is weaker than
the strict convexity of f , but stronger than strict risk aversion, since the DM is
strictly risk averse if and only if f and u are respectively convex and concave,
convexity of f or concavity of u being strict.
6.5ii) implies that the utility function of the second period is strictly concave.
Hence, the DM is strictly risk averse in the strong sense, and strictly pessimistic.
Proposition 6.7 Under assumptions 4.1 and 6.5, a RDEU DM is locally weakly
prudent.
Proof
Let us consider (a,w) ∈ R+2∗ , and Z a random variable in V such that E(Z) = 0
and t ∈ R such that a+tZ ≥ 0. For simplicity of notation, denote x∗(a,w) = x∗
and x∗(a+ tZ,w) = x˜∗.
We intend to prove that there exists t0 > 0 such that 0 < |t| ≤ t0 implies
x˜∗ ≥ x∗.
If x∗ = 0, the result is trivial.
Assume that x∗ ∈ (0, w]. Let us define, ∀x ∈ [0, w]:
g(x) = v(w − x) + u(a+ x) and h(x) = v(w − x) + EfoPu(a+ x+ tZ).
Clearly g
′
(x) = −v′(w − x) + u′(a+ x).
First suppose that t > 0 is chosen small enough such that a+ tZ ≥ 0.
Since for t > 0, the class C of random variables defined by: Z and u(a+x+ tZ),
is a class of comonotonic random variables, from lemma 3.1 there exists a prob-
ability Q, Q ≥ foP, such that EfoP (Z) = EQ(Z) and EfoPu(a + x + tZ) =
EQu(a+ x+ tZ) for such a small t > 0.
It turns out that h
′
(x) = −v′(w − x) + EQu′(a+ x+ tZ).
Let [m,M ] be the range of Z, hence from the Taylor formula applied to z ∈
[m,M ]:
u′(a+ x+ tz) = u′(a+ x) + tzu′′(a+ x) + (tz)
2
2 u
′′′(a+ x+ θz.tz); θz ∈ (0, 1).
Since u′′′ is continuous hence bounded on [0, a+ x+M ], it comes:
EQu
′
(a+x+tZ) = u′(a+x)+t[EQ(Z)u′′(a+x)+(t)], with (t)→ 0, where t→
0+. Given that f(p) < p, ∀p ∈ (0, 1), we know that EfoP (Z) < EP (Z) = 0
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(Quiggin [15], Chateauneuf and Cohen [5]), i.e. EQ(Z) < 0.
Since u′′(a+ x∗) < 0 it is obvious that there exists t1 > 0 such that: 0 < t ≤ t1
implies EQu
′
(a+ x∗ + tZ) > u′(a+ x∗), hence h′(x∗) > 0.
Let us now suppose that t < 0 is chosen small enough such that a+ tZ ≥ 0.
Pairwise comonotonicity of −Z and u(a+x+tZ), t < 0, implies from lemma 3.1
the existence of a probability Q, Q ≥ foP , such that: EfoP (−Z) = EQ(−Z)
and EfoPu(a+ x+ tZ) = EQu(a+ x+ tZ) for t < 0 small enough.
The same reasoning as above gives: h
′
(x) = −v′(w − x) + EQu′(a + x + tZ)
and EQu
′
(a+x+ tZ) = u′(a+x)+ (−t)[EQ(−Z)u′′(a+x)+ (t)], with (t)→
0, where t→ 0−.
Again f(p) < p, ∀p ∈ (0, 1) implies EfoP (−Z) < EP (−Z) = 0, i.e. EQ(−Z) <
0.
Since u′′(a+ x∗) < 0 it is clear that there exists t2 > 0 such that: 0 < −t ≤ t2
implies EQu
′
(a+ x∗ + tZ) > u′(a+ x∗), hence h′(x∗) > 0.
Take t0 = min(t1, t2), we have 0 < |t| ≤ t0 implies h′(x∗) > 0. That is
0 < |t| ≤ t0 implies x˜∗ ≥ x∗, which completes the proof.
7 Concluding remarks
The concept of prudence is at least as popular as the concept of risk aversion
among economists. Nevertheless, it seems that it had not yet received so robust
foundations, and as a matter of fact, there did not exist a complete charateriza-
tion of this behavioral assumption even in the classical context of the expected
utility model. It is obvious that the previous analysis of the prudence, focusing
on the precautionary motive for savings, provide only sufficient conditions - not
necessary conditions, for prudent behaviors to exist.
This paper was an attempt to fulfil this gap, and successfully affords a complete
characterization of prudence both in the EU model and in the RDEU frame-
work. We have considered the basic two-period consumption/saving problem
where the DM is facing a risky income in second period, and where his first
and second period consumption utility, respectively v and u, are assumed to be
concave. When the usual assumption according to which u = v is introduced,
we have shown that prudence is fully characterized by the convexity of u′ in
the EU model, while we have proven that for the RDEU model, prudence is
fully characterized by the convexity of u′ and strong pessimism. Interestingly
enough, we have shown through two sensible examples that, relaxing the as-
sumption u = v, the convexity of u′is neither necessary nor sufficient in a EU
context to obtain a prudent behavior. But, in the RDEU model, we obtain
that strong pessimism and the convexity of u′ are necessary and sufficient for
prudence when u 6= v, as far as the first period utility function is well behaved
(respects Inada conditions).
Although the paper mainly considers the case of a large income risk, under-
stood in the sense of mean preserving increase in risk (MPIR), we also adress
the issue of prudence in the case of a small (actuarially neutral) risk in the
sense of Arrow [2]. This has allowed us to introduce the concept of local weak
prudence, attended to parallel the analysis of first order risk aversion in the
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sense of Segal and Spivak [18]. The paper finally has shown that for a strong
risk averse RDEU decision maker, strict pessimism allows local weak prudence,
whatever the sign of u′′′.
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